January 12-13, 2017
We expect to have around 16 talks and 40 young researchers participating. Talks are 40 min long and the idea is to cover recents results on the topics of the schools.
Download the Workshop presentations
Workshop presentations
Confirmed Speakers
- Juan Escobar, Universidad de Chile
- Srihari Govindan, Department of Economics, University of Rochester
- John Hillas, Economics Department, University of Auckland
- Alejandro Jofré, CMM, Universidad de Chile
- Rida Laraki, Lamsade, Université Paris-Dauphine
- Andy Mc Lennan, School of Economics, The University of Queensland
- David Rahman, University of Minnesota
- Terry Rockafellar, University of Washington
- Sylvain Sorin, Université Pierre et Marie Curie
- Tristan Tomala, GREGHEC, HEC Paris
- Andries Vermeulen, Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University
- Yannick Viossat, CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine
- Bernhard von Stengel, Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics
- Mario Bravo, Universidad de Santiago de Chile
Program
| Thursday | Friday | |
| 09:30-10:10 | Von Stengel | Scarsini |
| 10:10-10:50 | McLennan | Correa |
| Break | ||
| 11:10-11:50 | Govindan | Rahman |
| 11:50-12:30 | Hillas | Escobar |
| Lunch | ||
| 14:30-15:10 | Tomala | Schroeder |
| 15:10-15:50 | Vermeulen | Laraki |
| Break | ||
| 16:10-16:50 | Viossat | Bravo |
| 16:50-17:30 | Rockafellar | Sorin |
Workshop titles
Bernhard von Stengel
Index and Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibria
Andy Mac Lennan
The Index +1 Principle
Srihari Govindan
On the conjecture of Hoffbauer
John Hillas
Backward Induction in Games without Perfect Recall (With Dmitriy Kvasov)
Tristan Tomala
Competitive Information Design (With Frédéric Koessler (PSE), Marie Laclau (PSE) and Tristan Tomala (HEC Paris).
Dries Vermeulen
Catch Games: the impact of modeling decisions (With János Flesch and Anna Zseleva)
Yannick Viossat
Imitation dynamics and dominated strategies (With Panayotis Mertikopoulos, CNRS & Univ. Grenoble and Bill Sandholm, Wisconsin Univ.)
Terry Rockafellar
Variational analysis of equilibrium points
Marco Scarsini
On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games
(With Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi and Roberto Cominetti)
José Rafael Correa
Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers
Juan Escobar
Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games
Marc Schroeder
Profit maximization and tolls in routing games
David Rahman
An Alternative Proof of Rochet’s Theorem
Rida Laraki
Existence of Maximal Elements and Coalitional Equilibria under Discontinuous Preferences
Mario Bravo
Learning and convergence to Nash in games with continuous action sets
Sylvain Sorin
Composite games and delegation games