Satisfying Instead of Optimizing in the Nash Demand Games

Speaker: Prof. Sigifredo Laengle
University of Chile, Santiago, Chile

Date: July 22, 2020 at 10:00

Abstract: The Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash 1953) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model is still subject to active research, in fact, it maintains a set of open questions regarding how agents optimally select their decisions and how they face uncertainty. However, the agents act rather guided by chance and necessity, with a Darwinian flavor. Satisfying, instead of optimising. The Viability Theory (VT) has this approach. Therefore, we investigate the NDG under this point of view. In particular, we ask ourselves two questions: if there are decisions in the NDG that ensure viability and if this set also contains Pareto and equilibrium strategies. Thus, carrying out the work, we find that the answers to both questions are not only affirmative, but that we also advance in characterising viable NDGs. In particular, we conclude that a certain type of NDGs ensures viability and equilibrium. Many interesting questions originate from this initial work. For example, is it possible to fully characterise the NDG by imposing viability conditions? Under what conditions does viability require cooperation? Is extreme polarisation viable?

The slides of the conference can be downloaded here

Venue: Online via Google Meet –

A brief biography of the speaker: Prof. Sigifredo Laengle   is an Associate Professor at the University of Chile since 2007. He received his PhD in Germany working on the theoretical problem of the value of information in organisations. He has published articles that articulate phenomena of strategic interaction, and optimisation.

Coordinators: Abderrahim Hantoute and Fabián Flores-Bazán (Universidad de Concepción)